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Wood: Administrative Law - The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrati
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, Laramie River Conservation Council and Powder River Basin
Resource Council v. Industrial Siting Council of the State of Wyoming
and Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 588 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 1978).

Eight years ago, the Missouri Basin Systems Group invited regional power suppliers' to participate in building
joint generation facilities. This invitation matured into the
Missouri Basin Power Project' to construct the Laramie
River Station,3 a 1.3 billion dollar," 1,500 megawatt, three
unit coal-fired steam electric generating station5 with attendant facilities. 6 Once the magnitude of the project was determined, the construction period was calculated to be seven
and one-half years. 7 However, construction was delayed by
the enactment of the Industrial Development Information
and Siting Act 8 on June 1, 1975. Even though a sizable investment 9 had already been made on the project, the proposed Laramie River station fell within the Act's proscription.
No person shall commence to construct a facility, as
defined in this act, in the state without first having
obtained a permit issued with respect to such facility by the council.1"
Copyright @1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Lincoln Electric System of Lincoln, Nebraska, Hartland Consumers Power District,
Missouri Basin Municipal Power Agency, and Basin Electric Power Cooperative
began the planning process. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association,
Inc. and the Wyoming Municipal Electric Joint Powers Board joined later. Cox,
MissouRi BASIN POWER PROJECT CHRONOLOGY 1971-1978 (unpublished document for

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

the Powder River Basin Resource Council). See also, Brief for Appellee at 5, Laramie
River Conservation Council v. Industrial Siting, 588 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 19781.
[hereinafter cited as Laramie River].
The appellee. Basin Electric Power Cooperative is the designated project manager
of the Missouri Basin Power Project. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 49, Laramie
River.
This facility is to be located in Platte County, Wyoming, on the south bank of the
Laramie River. approximately five miles northeast of Wheatland, Wyoming.
Laramie River at 1244.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Laramie River. In 1975 dollars, the anticipated total cost of
the Laramie River Station and its appurtenant facilities is approximately
$975,927,758. Laramie River at 1244.
Brief for Appellee at 4, Laramie River.
"Attendant proposed facilities include the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir, with a
design storage capacity of 104,000 acre feet covering a surface area of 3,547 acres at
normal hgh water level (TR-188), and numerous transmission lines radiating from
the plant." Brief for Appellee at 4, Laramie River.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Laramie River.
WYo. STAT. §§ 35-12-101 - 35-12-121 (1977).
From January through October of 1973, the project authorized the purchase of
lands and water rights for the Laramie River Station and the Grayrocks Reservoir.
NEWS

10.

FROM THE LARAMIE RIVER CONSERVATION COUNCIL, FOR RELEASE OCTOBER

10, 1978 (unpublished document). In August of 1974 the Rural Electrification Administration executed a loan commitment agreement with the Federal Financing
Bank (Department of the Treasury) for $1.5 billion of which $1.2 billion was
ultimately committed to the construction of the project. MissouRI BASIN POWER
PROJECT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 1.
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-106(a) (1977).
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The permitting process set out in the Siting Act was designed to provide Wyoming with a comprehensive scheme to
maintain control over location, size and operation of a proposed facility so as to protect the physical environment and
mitigate the social and economic impacts of natural resource
and industrial development. The regulatory powers described in the Siting Act are primarily vested in the Industrial Facility Siting Administration" but the final decision'" on permit applications is made by a seven person
13
citizen council appointed by the Governor.

A complete application for a siting permit was filed by
Basin Electric Power Cooperative with the Industrial Siting
Council on December 22, 1975.1 Four months later, 5 at the
end of Stage 116 and after the requisite 17 notice and public
hearing,' 8 the council approved the application and issued a

permit subject to conditions. In so doing, the council found
that Basin Electric Power Cooperative adequately met the
statutory requirements:
(i) that the proposed facility complies with all applicable law;
(ii) that the facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment nor to the social and economic con11.

WYo. STAT. § 35-12-103 (1977).

12. The council does not select the location of facilities or evaluate alternative sites. It
does, however, pass judgment on the adequacy of the site selected by the development company and it may impose conditions on and monitor the construction of the
facility.
13. Wyo. STAT. § 35-12-106 (1977).
14. In the Matter of Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Docket No. WISA-75-3 at 3
(April 26, 1976).
15. April 29, 1976, Id Permit No. ISC-00-02-76.
16. The Siting Act establishes a two stage permitting process. Stage I requires the submission of the application, staff review and councilconsideration and determination
as to:

"i Approving the application and issuing a permit with no conditions;
"(ii) Approving the application and issuing a permit conditioned upon commencing the construction at a reasonable time specified by the council;
S"(iii) Approving the application and issuing a permit conditioned upon specified
changes in the application;
"(iv) Rejecting the application pending further study as required by the council
if the applicant is not able to derionstrate to the council that the requirements of
subsection (c) of this section have been met." WYo. STAT. § 35-12-109(e) (1977).
Stage II decisions are governed by Wyo. STAT. § 35-12-114 (1977) which requires intensive investigation, study and evaluation of the proposed facility, its purpose, and seven "impact" elements. WYo. STAT. § 35-12-111 (1977). The cost of this
study is borne by the applicant and may be as much as one million dollars. Wyo.
STAT. § 35-12-110 (1977).
17. WYO.STAT, § 35-12-109 (1977).
18. A prehearing conference was held on the application on February 12, 1976. The
evidentiary hearing was conducted on February 23-27 and March 2-4, 1976. Basin
Electric Power Cooperative, supra note 14, at 4-5.
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dition of inhabitants or expected inhabitants in the affected
area; and
(iii) that the facility will not substantially impair the
health, safety or welfare of the inhabitants. 9
Contending that the council should have rejected the application pending further study in the Stage II analysis,
Laramie River Conservation Council and Powder River Basin Resource Council appealed the decision to the district
court for judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act.20 The district court affirmed the final order of
the Siting Council granting the permit. 1 On appeal, the
Wyoming Supreme Court defined the proper standard for judicial review of the council's decision to grant the permit.
Limited by this standard, the court affirmed the order of the
district court and held that the record was sufficient to support the factual determinations made by the Industrial Siting Council. 2
SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Industrial Siting Act establishes the right of an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review when a decision is
issued after a hearing on an application for a permit.23 The
Siting Act requires the standard for review to be the same
cases under the Wyoming Adstandard used in all contested
24
Act.
Procedure
ministrative
Specifically the Court's review is limited to a determination that:
(i) the agency acted without or in excess of its powers;
(ii) the decision or other agency action was procured
by fraud;
(iii) the decision or other agency action is in conformity
with law;
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

WYo. STAT. § 35-12-109 (1977).
WYo. STAT. §§ 9-4-101 - 9-4-115 (1977).

Laramie River at 1244.
Laramie River at 1245.
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-115(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-115(b) (1977).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 11

610

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

(iv) the findings of facts in issue in a contested case are
supported by substantial evidence; and
(v) the decision or other agency action is arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. 5
This standard limits the scope of judicial review into the
agency action and such a limit is necessary both as a practical and legal matter. As a practicai matter, the court's role
in reviewing agency action should not put the courts and the
agencies in competition. It should allow the court to recognize and protect the integrity and autonomy of the administrative process and yet still function as supervisor of the administrative agencies in furtherance of the public interest.2
As a legal matter, if a court tries the issues anew, exercising
its independent judgment on the merits, facts, or evidence,
or substitutes its judgment and discretion for that of the administrative agency, such court action would be in excess of
its constitutional powers.27 Such action would be to perform
duties, administrative or legislative in nature, assigned by
law to administrative agencies, 8 in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Inasmuch as the scope of review is limited by the standard set out in the Administrative Procedure Act, it is essential that a reviewing court understand and correctly apply
this standard. The purpose of this note is to evaluate the
court's scope of review in the instant case as an expression
and application of the standard for review. This evaluation
requires a discussion of the scope of the court's power to
scrutinize the product of the administrative process by inquiring into: (1) the lawfulness or legality of the administrative action or order, and (2) the reasonableness of the administrative action or order.
An inquiry into the legality of the administrative order
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act may involve determining whether the agency acted in excess of its
27.

WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114(c) (1977).
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC. 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
den., 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
2 AM. JuR. Administrative Law § 613.

28.

Sweetwater Co. Pl. Corn. For Org. Sch. Dist. v. Hinkle, 493 P.2d 1050, 1052 11972).

25.
26.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/11
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powers 29 or whether the action was procured by fraud. 0 It
also may raise the question of whether the administrative action or order is in conformity with the procedures mandated
by the Administrative Procedure Act." The Laramie River
case does not examine this aspect of the proper scope of
judicial review. Therefore, the issue of the legality of the
agency action will not be further explored.
An inquiry into the reasonableness of the administrative
action or order is not the power "to determine whether the
action is right, correct, wise, advisable or best fitted to the
situation involved." 2 Rather, it involves the examinations of
three statutory issues:
1. review the agency's determinations of law under the
33
standard of whether the decision is in conformity with law;
2. review the agency's findings of fact under the standard of whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence;3 4 and
3. review the validity of the agency's inferences (i.e. the
agency's discretionary determinations that the law applies
to the facts as proven), under the standard of whether the
decision is arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of
35
discretion.
The Laramie River case explores the reasonableness
aspect of the scope of judicial review. As stated above, this
note will evaluate the court's scope of review in determining
the reasonableness of the agency action under the standards
set out in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The
conclusion of this note will be that, under the proper standard for review, the scope of judicial review is dependent
upon the type of agency determination being reviewed (law,
fact, or inference). However, the instant case illustrates the
court's tendency to commingle these three aspects of review,
and migrate to a middle position of the "substantial evidence" rule for all three determinations. To this extent
meaningful judicial review in Wyoming is impaired.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

WYo.
Wvo.
WYO.
2 AM.
WYo.
Wvo.
WYO.

STAT. § 9-4-114(c}(i) (1977).
STAT. § 9-4-114(c)(ii) (1977).
STAT. § 9-4-114(c)(iii) (1977).
JUR. Administrative Law § 611.
STAT. § 94-114(c)(ii) (1977).
STAT. * 9-4-114(cJ(iv) (1977).
STAT. § 9-4-114(c)(v) (1977).
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE

The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act limits
court review of findings of fact by an agency to the question
of whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 6 This codifies the general rule that "the findings of an
[administrative agency] as to the facts, if supported by
substantialevidence, shall be conclusive." 37 The meaning of
"substantial evidence" is explored in the Laramie River
case:
[I]t may be less than the weight of the evidence, but
it cannot clearly be contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. More is required than a mere
scintilla of evidence or suspicion of the existence of
a fact to be established.38
This definition is as clear and as vague as it should be."
The substantial evidence rule must be sufficiently flexible in
its application to enable the reviewing court to correct whatever ascertainable abuses may arise in the decision-making
process, yet limit the review consistent with effective administration of the substantive legislation."' The main inquiry
then is whether, on the record, there was such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
make the finding of fact. 4' The test, is reasonableness, not
rightness. The rule does not permit the rejection of agency
findings simply because a reasonable mind might have arrived at a different conclusion. 2 So long as the evidence is
competent and the best available, the findings based on the
evidence are respected as determined on the basis of the expertise and experience of the agency in such matters."
At this point, it is important to note that the court in the
Laramie River case over-applied the substantial evidence
rule. The court primarily relied on the rule to uphold the
council's conclusions, not its findings of fact. There was not
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114ic)(iv) (1977).
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55, 97 S.Ct. 229, 53 L.Ed.
2d 100 (1977).
Laramie River at 1249.
DAVis, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
2 AM. JUR. Administrative Law 621.
Id
5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01 (1978).
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Wyofning Oil and Gas Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 554
(Wyo. 1968).
MEZINES, STEIN AND GRUFF,
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any significant dispute over the majority of the findings of
the council." The dispute arose because of the council's
determination "that the facility will not pose a threat of
serious injury to the environment nor to the social and
economic condition of the inhabitants or expected inhabitants in the affected area. 4 5 This is a statutorily required
conclusion which must be demonstrated in the siting permit
application based on facts about the location, size and operation of the proposed facility. Therefore, the disputes were
not about any finding of fact, but about the sufficiency of
those facts in justifying the statutorily required conclusion.
The issue of whether a conclusion is justified on the basis of
the facts found is not to be tested by the Administrative Procedure Act's rule of substantial evidence. Rather, it should
be judged both by a determination of the soundness of the
facts found, under the "substantial evidence rule", and by a
determination of the validity of the inferences which are
drawn from the facts and used to reach the conclusion.
INFERENCES AND REASONABLENESS

An inference is a process of reasoning by which a conclusion is reached and affirmed on the basis of one or more facts
accepted.4 6 The question of the validity of the inference does
not rest on the truth of the initial and end points of the process (the facts and the conclusion), but rather on the nature
of the process itself. The analysis of the process involves
deciding whether the conclusion reached follows from the
facts accepted. This is essentially an inquiry into the
necessary relationship required between the facts and the
conclusion.
The general rule for the review of agency inferences is
that, just as the fact-finding process is a function for administrative agencies, so also is the drawing of inferences from
the evidence."7 The scope of review for the exercise of discretion in applying broad statutory language to varying fact
44.

One issue raised by the Appellant with regard to the council's findings deals with
the effect of the proposed facility on the agricultural community. The argument is
that the council failed to make complete findings and conclusions from uncontradicted evidence regarding economic effects on the inhabitants in the affected
area. Brief for Appellant at 61, Laramie River.

45.

WYO. STAT. § 35.12-109(c)(ii) (1977).

46.
47.

CoPe, INTRODUCTION To LOGIC, at 5 (4th ed. 1972).
FTC v. Pac. States Paper Ass'n., 273 U.S. 52, 63, 47 S.Ct. 255, 71 L.Ed 534 (1927).
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patterns is usually stated in general terms of action found to
be "arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of
discretion. "48 However, these terms do little to articulate the
process of review by which the issue of the existence of the
necessary relationship is to be decided. 49 Wyoming cases provide limited guidance for establishing a meaningful standard
for judicial review of agency inferences.
[A]rbitary and capricious action on the part of an
administrative agency is wilful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts
and circumstances.50
[A]n action .. . will be considered arbitrary when
taken without the [agency] having before it sufficient information upon which to make a proper decision.51

[A]rbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse
of discretion... [involves] whether the Council's decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors or whether the Council committed error so
clear as to deprive its decision of a rational basis.52
From the above cases, the test of the relationship between facts and conclusions appears to be whether the conclusions reasonably or rationally may be based upon the relevant factors. This test is reinforced in the instant case:
"[E]xamination [of all the evidence] must lead the reviewing
court to the conclusion that there is present such relevant
evidence as might lead a reasonable mind to the conclusion
manifested in the questioned agency finding.""
Therefore, to uphold the council's conclusion that the
facility will not pose a threat of serious injury, the reviewing
court must find a reasonable or rational relationship between
the relevant evidence and the statutorily required conclusion. This process examines both the validity of the inferential process and the facts from which the process begins.
Furthermore, the test for a reasonable relationship appears
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114(c)(v) (1977).

State Court Review of Administrative Action Prescribingthe
Scope of Review, 1977 Aeiz. ST. L.J. 537, 550 (1977).
Marathon Oil Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 473 P.2d 575, 577 (Wyo. 1970).
Monahan v. Bd. of Trustees, etc., Co. of Fremont, 486 P.2d 235, 237 (Wyo. 1971).
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assoc., Inc. v. The Environmental Quality
Council of the State of Wyoming, P.2d (Wyo. 1979).
Laramie River at 1249.
BRODIE AND LINDE,
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to be whether the facts proven are logically sufficient upon
which to base the conclusion, and whether the conclusion
was, as a matter of fact, made with a full consideration of the
facts. If these inquiries are made5" into the inferential process, and the facts are based upon substantial evidence, the
reviewing court is not free to set aside the agency's conclusions, even though the court "might have come to a different
conclusion than the one drawn by the agency.' '
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

An analysis of the evidence supporting the findings of
fact and the validity of the inferences from these findings
has no significance without a determination of whether the
agency has inferred the "correct ' ' 6 conclusion from the
facts.
The conclusion which is required by the Siting Act is
"that the facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to
the environment nor to the social and economic condition of
inhabitants or expected inhabitants in the affected area." '
This is different from the conclusion that the facility will not
cause serious injury. An agency can legitimately draw the
latter conclusion from the slightest evidence in favor of the
assertion that there will be no injury. Furthermore, the conclusion is justified even if there is a reasonable possibility
that there will be injury." However, one could argue that
"pose a threat" cannot be satisfied if there is a reasonable
possibility that there will be injury, inasmuch as injury is,
therefore, threatened.
From the distinction between "cause injury" and
"threaten injury" it is important to inquire whether the applicant proved and the council found that the facility will not
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

It is not clear that the court in the instant case addressed itself to these issues.
Laramie River at 1250.
The term "correct" is used not normatively but factually to indicate the conclusion
required by the substantive legislation.
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-109(c)(ii) (1977).
This argument has some weight upon review of Regulation 6b. which sets forth the
following rule of decision:
In order to demonstrate that the facility does not pose a threat of serious
injury, the applicant must demonstrate that the granting of a permit will
not result in a significant detriment to, or impairment of, the environment
or the social and economic conditions of present or expected inhabitants.
However, the language may be consistent with the legislation as an administrative express of the legal principle that the law is not concerned with trifles.
Brief for Appellee, Industrial Siting Council at 29, Laramie River.
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cause serious injury, or that the facility will not pose a threat
of serious injury. If the evidence justified only the former
conclusion and the council, on the basis of a regulation interpreting the statute, held that to be sufficient, one could
argue that the correct statutorily require conclusion was not
made on the siting permit application. Evidence which left
open a reasonable possiblity of injury would satisfy the test
of "will not cause serious injury," but not the statutory mandate of "will not pose a threat of serious injury." Therefore,
the facts and the inferences, even though justified by substantial evidence and reasonableness, are not sufficient to arrive at the correct statutorily mandated conclusion.
Appellants' Burden of Proof Argument
The Appellants, Laramie River Conservation Council
and Powder River Basin Resource Council, used this distinction between "cause injury" and "threaten injury" to
challenge the council's conclusions on the application. They
concluded that this distinction required the applicant to bear
a heavier burden of proof than the preponderance of evidence
test 9 to obtain a permit in the first stage of review.60 This is
not a correct conclusion to draw from the distinction. The
burden is raised above preponderance of evidence to prove
that the facility will not cause injury. However, this is
because the applicant is proving "threaten" and not
"cause." A preponderance of evidence is still the correct
burden so long as the preponderance goes to prove that the
facility will not threaten injury.
The Necessity for Review of Statutory Construction
Unfortunately, neither the court nor the appellants
recognized the fallacy in the burden of proof argument. The
court's attention was never directed toward whether the
council had misconstrued the statutory language of "will not
pose a threat" to mean the lesser requirement of "will not
59.

In Wyoming, the preponderance of evidence test denotes the following:
That where the evidence justified either of two reasonable inferences, one
favorable to the party having the burden of proof and the other favorable
to his opponent, the trier of the facts should be allowed to determine
which, if either, of the two inferences is more reasonable or probable, and
make his findings accordingly. White v.Maverick Production Company,

60.

Brief for Appellant at 17, Laramie River.

182 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1947).
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cause." However, had this issue been directly addressed by
the court, the case still may have been decided along the
same lines. The court, in rejecting the burden of proof argument, said the standards suggested by the council's rules
and regulations on "pose a threat" did not conflict with the
Siting Act. In the court's words, "We can find no inherent irrationality or unreasonableness of these standards, and consequently, we hold that these standards, not the standard of
no reasonable possibility suggested by the appellant shall
govern." 6'
The problem with the court's discussion of the council's
rules and regulations is that the standard for the review of
an agency's interpretation of its statute is not that of "inherent irrationality or unreasonableness." The interpretation of a statute involves a question of law which ultimately
is for the courts. This is a duty which must be exercised and
cannot be surrendered, waived 61 or even, as some cases hold,
restricted by the legislature. 3 The general rule is that the
courts may justifiably rely on the aid of practical administrative construction of an ambiguous statute. 4 Substitution of
judicial judgment on all questions that are literally or analytically "law" is undesirable, for many questions of policy
which, through adjudication or rule-making, become crystallized into law are peculiarly within the agency's competence
and not especially within the competence of the reviewing
court. 5
This philosophy on statutory construction is reflected in
a recent 1978 Supreme Court case:
The construction put on a statute by an agency
charged with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction
will be affirmed if it has a reasonable basis in law.
But the courts are final authorities on issues of
statutory construction ...

and are not obliged to

stand aside and rubber stamp their affirmance of
administrative decisions that they deem inconsis61. Laramie River at 1242.
62. 2 AM. Jur. Administrative Law § 251.
63. Id. at § 656.
64. Id. at § 251.
65. DAvIS, supra note 39, at § 30.01. See also Moog Industries,Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S.
411, 78 S.Ct. 377. 2 L.Ed. 2d 370 (1958).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 11

618

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

tent with a statutory mandate or that frustrates the
congressional policy underlying the statute. 8
Therefore, the important issue with regard to the review
of the agency construction of "pose a threat" is not whether
the standard is inherently irrational or unreasonable as suggested in the instant case. Rather, the task is to inquire into
the correctness of the administrative construction judged by
the agency's compliance with the fundamental rule in the
construction of a statute: "to ascertain, if possible, what the
legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of
the objects and purposes to be accomplished. 6' 7 Only by

such an inquiry can the courts restrict agencies to their basic
role of executing legislative policy. Agencies are no more authorized than are the courts to rewrite substantive legisla68

tion.

Scope of Review of Statutory Construction
The necessity for judicial inquiry and the minimum
scope of the inquiry into agency statutory construction
depends upon the history, terms and purposes of the legislation and the extent these are mirrored by the agency interpretation. Therefore, to ascertain the full scope of judicial
review in the area of statutory construction, one must determine the reviewing court's willingness to independently
scrutinize the history, terms and purposes of the legislation
and how close the court's decision must parallel the product
of the administrative process. This involves the question of
whether the court will require the agency's construction to
be right (representing a close fit with the court's judgment),
or merely reasonable.
The Court's Independent Scrutiny
The general limitation on administrative construction
requires the court to independently scrutinize the terms of
the legislation to determine whether the statute is ambiguous, and thus subject to construction by the agency. If a
statute is not ambiguous and its construction is not doubtful, the rule that courts will give weight to an administrative
66.
67.
68.

98 S.Ct. 1702, 1712. 56 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1978).
SEC v. Sloan, - U.S. _
School District Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9 & 10 v. Cook, 424 P.2d 751, 756 (Wyo. 1967).
Tallay v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).
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construction determining the true meaning of a statute is
not applicable. 6

s

The agency has no duty to interpret that

which the legislators have made clear.
The court in the instant case made a limited inquiry into
the ambiguity of the Siting Act. The court concluded that
the statute is not ambiguous with regard to whether granting a permit after the initial hearing is the exception and
limited to low impact facilities, at the small end of the jurisdictional scale, with no potential for a problem.7" Even
though the analysis concluded no ambiguity, the court not
only allowed, but completely deferred to the construction
placed on the statute "by the Industrial Siting Council and
the direction and the staff all of whom are charged with the
administration of the ...Siting Act."'" This deference, even

though inappropriate, does indicate that, had an inquiry
been made into the ambiguity of the statutory language
"pose a threat," the court probably would have deferred to
the construction placed on the phrase by the council's regulations.
This willingness to defer to the agency's construction of
law precludes any meaningful judicial review and abrogates
the court's duty to assure that the legislative policies
underlying the Siting Act will be executed. Surely an administrative agency cannot finally decide the limits of its own
statutory authority, for that is peculiarly a judicial function.
Furthermore, the history of administrative law in Wyoming
is not in accord with such a deferral to the agency. The
Supreme Court of Wyoming did not hesitate to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency in Ruby v. Schuett" or in
Bosler v. McKechnie73 after a determination that the agencies misinterpreted certain statutes. The matter of statutory
construction must not be finally entrusted to administrative
agencies, but decided ultimately by the courts."4
The Right vs. The Reasonable Construction
Once a court conducts an independent judicial inquiry
into legislative intent, how willing is it to substitute its judg69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Demos v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Natrona County, 571 P.2d 980. 981 (1977).
Laramie River at 1250.
Id.
360 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1961).
362 P.2d 809 (Wyo. 1961).
2 AM. Jua.Administrative Law § 656.
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ment for the agency's reasonable but not parallel decision?
The suggestion in the Laramie River case is that the
agency's regulatory interpretation should be upheld unless
irrational or unreasonable.7" Prior to this case, the test of
agency construction of the law it administered was expressed as a "clearly erroneous" test whereby the agency's
construction, while not controlling, was entitled to great
weight and would not be disregarded except when it was
clear that such construction was erroneous.7" The reasonableness test has found expression more often in the United
States Supreme Court. Under this test, the agency's determination of a broad statute is accepted if it had "warrant in
the record" and a reasonable basis in law.77
An analysis into the distinction between a finding of
"clearly erroneous" and "unreasonableness" is probably less
helpful than a view into what the courts in this area need not
find. To sustain an agency's determination, the court need
not find that [the agency's] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result that [the court] would
have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in
judicial proceedings. Particularly, this respect is due when
the administrative practice at stake involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the
responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, or making
the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet
untried and new."
In conclusion, the court is not demanding a close fit between the court's interpretation of the statute and that of
the agency. That the court would have construed the statute
differently and such construction is itself reasonable is not
determinative. Rather, the court, with an eye on its own interpretation of the history, terms and purposes of the legislation, must hold that the agency's construction is itself
reasonable and not clearly erroneous.
75.
76.
77.

78.

Laramie River at 1249.
State v. Board of Land Commissioners, 58 P.2d 423, 431 (Wyo. 1936) and State v,
Hunt, 57 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo. 1936).
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1070 (1944).
See also Bayside Enterprises,Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977), a more recent case
where the court upheld an agency determination as a reasonable interpretation of
the statute.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1965).
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External Factors
The "form" of the particular agency interpretation may
support a legislative intent to vest primary responsibility
with the agency for interpreting the statutory terms. This
analysis requires the characterization of the challenged regulation as either a substantive regulation, issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority to implement the statute,
or an interpretive regulation. Substantive regulations are
those the drafting of which is specifically entrusted by the
legislature to the agency. The agency has primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory terms involved. Such
regulations have the force and effect of law. The reviewing
court therefore is not free to set aside those regulations
simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner. 9 By way of contrast, a court is not required
to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying degrees
of deference are accorded administrative interpretations,
based on such factors as timing and consistency of the agency's position and the nature of its expertise.80
The regulation involved in the Laramie River case appears to be more interpretive than substantive. It was
drafted pursuant to the council's general authority to "promulgate rules and regulations... implementing this act."'"
It interprets and thereby gives content to the general phrase
"pose a threat" requiring, by regulation, a full consideration
of the pluses and minuses that will result from construction
of the facility. By way of contrast, it does not function as a
regulation which supplements the relevant and necessary
factors to be considered in the intensive investigation, study
and evaluation of the proposed facility and its effects in the
Stage II analysis."2 The latter is clearly substantive and
could be set aside only if the agency exceeded its "authority
or if the regulation is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.""3
General or ambiguous statutory terms may indicate a
legislative intent to rely on the practical application of the
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425. 97 S.Ct. 2999, 53 L.E. 2d 448 (1977).
1&Lat n. 9.
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-105(b) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 35-12-111(a) (1977).
Batterton v. Francis, supra note 79, at 426.
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statute to achieve effective administration. If such a statute
is involved, the courts should allow greater flexibility to the
agency to interpret the statute. This recognizes the agency's
unique opportunity to discover statutory inaccuracies and
deficiencies and, in the practical working of the statute, improve it.
The court may regard the agency with sufficient respect
to view it as uniquely qualified to appropriately interpret the
statute. In determining whether an agency's interpretation
of its statute should be upheld, the court should consider the
character of the particular agency. This consideration includes the nature of the problems with which the agency
deals, the consequences of its administrative action, the
agency's expertise, experience and the confidence which the
agency has won.
A final factor which should not be overlooked is the
court's own general philosophy of the proper division of
functions between courts and agencies. State courts, more
than the United States Supreme Court, probably take for
granted that the correct interpretation and application of
the terms used in a statute fall within their province.8 4 This
view is not reflected in the Laramie River Case but it has surfaced in a more recent Wyoming case.85
This attitude has also been reflected in Wyoming legislation. Two recent Wyoming statutes illustrate the modern
tendency to seek methods to curtail the discretion of administrative agencies to ensure due execution of legislative
policy. The Administrative Regulation Review" provisions
in the Wyoming Statutes allow the legislative management
council to examine the administrative rules and regulations
of any agency to determine if they properly implement legislative intent, are within the scope of delegated authority,
and are lawfully adopted.8 7
A product of the 1979 legislative session was an act
amending the Administrative Procedure Act by providing
84.
85.
86.
87.

BRODIE AND LINDE, supra note 49, at 546.
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assoc., Inc. v. The Environmental Quality
(Wyo. 1979).
P.2d Council of the State of Wyoming, WYO. STAT. §§ 28-9-101 through 28-9-108 (1977).
(1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-102ta)(i)
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new guidelines for the scope of judicial review of administrative proceedings. 8 With some omissions, it adopts almost
verbatim the scope-of-review provisions"9 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 90 The act expressly recognizes
the function of the reviewing court to decide all relevant
questions of law and interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions.' It also arguably alters the applicability of the
substantial evidence rule. The amended provisions appear to
make the rule applicable not only to findings of fact, but conclusions of law and other agency action taken in a hearing
provided for by statute.2 Inasmuch as the court in the
Laramie River case applied the substantial evidence rule to
the agency's conclusions, the act as amended is consistent
with the court's discussion.
CONCLUSION

The past and the newly amended provisions in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act on the scope of judicial
review of administrative orders both reflect a statement that
proper judicial review is an essential safeguard of fairness
and correctness in the administrative process. This legislative statement alone should prompt the court not only to
make a careful review, but to carefully state the scope of the
review made. Only by such care can the proper balance be
struck in each case between judicial review which is so cur88.

1979 ENROLLED AcT No. 47 (45th Legislative Session):
9-4-114. Judicial review by district courts; rules of supreme court to govern,
scope of review.
Ic) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
1i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or im16 In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations,

89.

or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
Section 2. This act is effective May 25, 1979.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).

90.

60 STAT. 237 (1946). as amended by 80 STAT. 392 (1966), 90 STAT. 2721 (1976).

91.
92.

WYO. STAT. § 9-4-114(c) (1979).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-114(c)(ii)(E) (1979).
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sory or remote that it fails to supply an adequate corrective
for arbitrary administration and judicial review which is so
all pervasive as to run counter to the basic idea of delegation
of responsibility to administrative agencies. This balance accomplishes two essential goals. It ensures both the legitimacy of the agency action and the positive solution of the
agency's problems. Neither goal has been significantly
secured by the decision in the Laramie River case.
NANCY
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